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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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It is a privilege to speak to you today under the auspices of the Schuman 
Centre, which honors Robert Schuman’s contribution to the economic recov­
ery and integration of Western Europe after the Second World War. The 
Schuman Plan, like the Marshall Plan, deserves to be remembered, not only 
for what it accomplished economically, but also for what it represented intel­
lectually and politically.
The Marshall Plan committed the United States to the recovery of Europe 
and fostered on the European side a process of intergovernmental cooperation 
that was formalized by the creation of the Organization for European Eco­
nomic Cooperation. It is now known as the Organization for Economic Coop­
eration and Development and is extending its membership eastward into Cen­
tral Europe and in other directions as well - to Mexico and, soon, Korea.
The Schuman Plan for Europe’s coal and steel industries was, in a sense, 
more ambitious than the Treaty of Rome, which established the European 
Economic Community. It envisaged a form of economic integration much 
more like a single market than a simple customs union.
My talk today will deal with some of the problems confronting Europe as it 
prepares for another major step in the process of integration - implementing 
the plan for economic and monetary union (EMU) contained in the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU). Constraints on your patience and my competence will 
prevent us from examining all of the issues posed by the plan in the treaty. I 
will therefore focus on five questions:
• How should the benefits and costs of monetary union be assessed in the 
present European context?
• How should the governments and institutions of the European Union (EU) 
apply the provisions of the treaty concerning the selection of eligible coun­
tries?
• How should the eligible countries go about locking their exchange rates, 
given their desire to minimize turbulence in the foreign-exchange market 




























































































• How should other EU countries manage their exchange rates after the 
monetary union begins?
• How will EMU affect other countries and the international monetary 
system?
Much has written on these issues recently, and 1 will cite some of the rele­
vant papers1. But we won’t take a tour of the academic literature. Instead, I 
will do what few other academics do - tell you what the treaty says, not what it 
would have said had it been drafted by clear-minded scholars instead of civil 
servants and politicians who had to produce an acceptable text by an agreed 
deadline.
The Benefits and Costs of Monetary Union
The main benefits of a monetary union are those obtained by using a single 
currency for cross-border trade and investment. The introduction of a single 
currency eliminates the transactions and accounting costs imposed by the need 
for currency conversions, and it also eliminates exchange-rate risk. But the 
gains may be far larger than the savings afforded by banishing these obvious 
costs and risks. Further gains will derive from “network externalities” that 
come with the use of a single currency.
The ease of using a single currency should encourage more firms, especially 
small firms, to participate in cross-border trade, stimulating trade in goods 
and services. That should raise allocative efficiency by intensifying competi­
tion. The introduction of a single currency should also promote cross-border 
trade in financial assets and thus the volume of transactions on European se­
curities markets. That should reduce transactions costs and should even reduce 
price volatility1 2. In brief, the move to a single currency can be expected to en­
hance the benefits conferred by the formation of the single market. A simple
1 More papers and references can be found in Arrowsmith et al. (1996a).
2 See Jones and Seguin (1995), who show that reductions in transactions costs have been 




























































































customs union does not require a monetary union. A full-fledged single mar­
ket may not work well without oneT
I often ask American students to contemplate the introduction of currency 
conversions and exchange-rate fluctuations within the United States. There are 
twelve Federal Reserve Banks in the United States, which issue their own dol­
lar bills. But those bills exchange at par and are, in any case, fully acceptable 
throughout the United States. What would happen, however, if the dollar bills 
issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston could be used only in New 
England and if the bills of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks were no longer 
exchangeable at immutably fixed exchange rates? Transactions costs would 
then impose a non-negligible tax on interregional trade in goods, services, and 
assets, and there would be exchange-rate risk as well. The resulting segmenta­
tion of the single U.S. market could impose large efficiency losses, even after 
firms and households had adjusted fully to the new regime3 4.
The main costs of a monetary union are those identified by the theory of 
optimum currency areas. They are the costs of giving up monetary autonomy. 
But discussions of those costs sometimes fail to distinguish between two 
meanings of monetary autonomy
(i) the freedom to conduct an independent monetary policy, and
(ii) the freedom to use the nominal exchange rate as a policy instrument. 
Most of the literature uses definition (ii), but let us dwell briefly on definition 
(i), because its implications are not always recognized.
In a world of high capital mobility, a small country that pegs its exchange 
rate cannot pursue an independent monetary policy. Even when open interest 
parity does not hold perfectly, the country’s short-term interest rate will be 
tied closely to foreign interest rates. In different terms, the central bank can­
not raise or reduce the stock of base money. When it adds to its domestic assets 
by, say, an open-market purchase of government securities, it can expect to
3 This view is commonly ascribed to the Commission (1990). More recently, the Com­
mission (1995a) has stressed the costs imposed by large exchange-rate changes between 
EU currencies - a controversial matter discussed below. Winkler (1996) surveys the rele­
vant literature on the network externalities conferred by the use of a single currency.
4 There would also be effects on the interregional distribution of federal tax and transfer 
payments, which is why I argued years ago that fiscal domains should not be broader 




























































































lose a similar amount of foreign assets (reserves), and there will be no appre­
ciable change in the stock of base money.
The story is slightly different for a large country. When the central bank 
acquires domestic assets, it will still lose foreign assets, but the loss will not 
offset fully the increase of domestic assets, and the central bank will have some 
control over the stock of base money. Such a country may even be able to ex­
ercise monetary leadership if it is the largest participant in a particular 
pegged-rate system. That was true for the United States under the Bretton 
Woods System and, more recently, for Germany under the European Mone­
tary System (EMS).
If a country - other than the leader - wants to exercise autonomy in this 
monetary-policy sense, it must allow its exchange rate to float. The central 
bank can then regulate the stock of base money, because it will not have to in­
tervene on the foreign-exchange market and thus sell foreign assets whenever 
it acquires domestic assets. Alternatively, it can vary short-term interest rates 
if it is willing to let market forces determine the nominal exchange rate. It 
follows, of course, that a country cannot exercise monetary autonomy in the 
monetary-policy sense without giving up autonomy in the exchange-rate sense.
These propositions are familiar. Why do I repeat them? Because they yield 
the most compelling argument for monetary union in the present European 
context: If EU countries want to peg the exchange rates between their curren­
cies, even with broad bands around them, they cannot pursue independent 
monetary policies. They can have only one monetary policy. But it should be a 
European policy, not that of any single EU country.
This proposition does not presuppose any difference in policy preferences 
among EU countries, although it has sometimes been cast in those terms. It 
arises from the intrinsic difference between the domain of a European mone­
tary policy and the domain of a national policy. The former must encompass 
the EU countries collectively or, at least, the subset countries that may form a 
monetary union in 1999; the European Central Bank should aim at maintaining 
price stability in the EU as a whole, not in any single EU country. A national 
monetary policy, by contrast, must focus on a single country; the Bundesbank, 
for example, must maintain price stability within Germany and cannot be ex­
pected to take account of economic conditions in other EU countries. The con­
sequences of this difference in domains may not be very noticeable most of the 



























































































policies differ greatly from country to country. That was the case in the early 
1990s, when Germany was wrestling with unification and most of its neigh­
bors were wrestling with recessions.
Turning to the exchange-rate definition of monetary autonomy, consider the 
case discussed by Mundell (1961) when he sought to define an optimum cur­
rency area. There are two countries, East and West. Each one produces a sin­
gle good, using variable amounts of labor and fixed amounts of capital, and 
both countries consume both goods. The money wage is fixed in each country, 
labor is fully employed initially, and trade is balanced. Now introduce an 
asymmetric shock - one that affects the two countries differently. Let there be 
a permanent switch in demand from Eastern to Western goods by consumers 
in one or both countries. This shock creates unemployment in the East and an 
excess demand for labor in the West, and the East starts to run a trade deficit 
with the West.
Conventional demand-management policies, described in the older literature 
as expenditure-changing policies, cannot correct these imbalances. An increase 
of Eastern aggregate demand can eliminate unemployment there but will 
widen the East’s trade deficit. A decrease of Eastern aggregate demand can 
eliminate the trade deficit but will increase Eastern unemployment. To address 
the two problems simultaneously, the two countries must accept or engineer a 
change in the real exchange rate betweens their currencies, described in the 
older literature as an expenditure-switching policy. A fall in the relative price 
of the Eastern good will raise the demand for the Eastern good by both coun­
tries’ consumers and will reduce the demand for the Western good. The de­
mand for labor will rise in the East, reducing unemployment, the demand for 
labor will fall in the West, and trade will move back into balance. When the 
wage rate is fixed in each country, however, there is only one way to make the 
requisite change in the real exchange rate - a depreciation or devaluation of 
the Eastern currency.
Clearly, countries like those in Mundell’s model will benefit from monetary 
autonomy in the exchange-rate sense. Its actual importance, however, will de­
pend on the size, frequency, and persistence of asymmetric shocks, the degree 
of wage rigidity, and the extent of labor mobility. If the shocks are small, 
rare, and transitory, there will be little need to change the real exchange rate 
and thus little need to change the nominal exchange rate. If nominal wages are 
fairly flexible, a change in labor-market conditions - the advent of excess 




























































































rate, obviating the need for changes in the nominal rate. If workers move 
freely from country to country in response to changes in the demand for 
labor, a shock of the sort we have just considered will not cause long-lasting 
imbalances in the two countries’ labor markets, and labor mobility will also 
reduce the trade-balance effects of the shock5.
Much attention has also been paid to the stabilizing role of endogenous fiscal 
transfers in federal states with large central governments. The fall in Eastern 
income caused by a switch in demand from Eastern to Western goods will au­
tomatically reduce tax payments by Eastern firms and households, cushioning 
the fall in Eastern disposable income. Conversely, the rise in Western income 
caused by the switch in demand will raise tax payments by Western firms and 
households, limiting the rise in Western disposable income. These things will 
happen whether or not the East and West belong to a federal state. When they 
do not belong to a federal state, however, the changes in tax payments will 
show up exclusively in their own governments’ budgets. When, instead, they 
do belong to a federal state, the changes in tax payments will be shifted in part 
to the federal budget, but the decrease in Eastern payments to the federal gov­
ernment will be partially offset by the increase in Western payments, and there 
will be little net effect on the federal budget6.
Economists have used these analytical findings to draw strong conclusions 
about the advisability of European monetary union - to ascertain whether the 
EU countries comprise an optimum currency area, or come close enough to 
that ideal type for them to form a monetary union without having to incur un­
acceptably high costs. It has been shown, for example, that the so-called core 
countries of the EU - Germany, France, and their near neighbors - have not 
suffered asymmetric shocks larger than those experienced by states or regions 
in the United States, which is the usual benchmark7. Therefore, it is said, 
monetary unification would not be more costly for those countries than for US 
states and regions. It has also been shown, however, that wage rates are more 
flexible in the United States and that labor mobility is higher. Therefore, US
5 If Eastern workers took jobs in the West, their demand for Western goods would be 
transformed from import demand into domestic demand, and their demand for Eastern 
goods would be transformed from domestic demand into import demand. These trans­
formations would reduce the Eastern trade deficit.
6 A number of studies have sought to measure these fiscal effects in federal states such as 
Canada and the United States. They are surveyed by Goodhart and Smith (1993), who 
conclude that endogenous changes in federal fiscal flows - transfers as well as tax pay­
ments - offset about 20 percent of a one-dollar fall in output and income.




























































































states and regions can adjust more readily to a shock of given size than can EU 
countries. Furthermore, the size and nature of the EU budget prevent it from 
serving effectively as a vehicle for income-stabilizing transfers like those that 
occur endogenously in federal fiscal systems* *.
But most of these considerations are virtually irrelevant to the European 
case, for one simple reason. Monetary autonomy in the exchange-rate sense is 
not really valuable unless a country is willing to use it. Conversely, the loss of 
autonomy suffered when a country joins a monetary union is costly to the 
country if - and only if - the country would otherwise change its exchange rate 
when it encountered a large asymmetric shock. Has that been true of Europe? 
No.
Countries such as the Netherlands have been loath to change their exchange 
rates because of the belief that a devaluation of the domestic currency cannot 
have any long-lasting effect on the real exchange rate of a small country; it 
will be offset by an increase of domestic prices9. Larger countries such as 
France have not wanted to change their exchange rates because of the belief 
that a fixed exchange rate is the most serviceable anchor for monetary policy 
and that the government’s credibility, broadly defined, depends on the credi­
bility of its commitment to keep the exchange rate from changing. Finally, 
there is the view, broadly held in Europe, that large exchange-rate changes 
will be corrosive of the single market and could even undermine the basic 
customs union - a view to which I will return when discussing exchange-rate 
arrangements after EMU has begun.
* Critics of EMU have also argued that, even if Europe can be regarded as an optimum cur­
rency area, the initial conditions are wrong. Countries such as Spain, with high unem­
ployment rates, should reduce them before joining a monetary union. See, e.g., George 
(1996), who does not advise those countries to devalue their currencies to create jobs but 
believes that “no matter how the unemployment issue is addressed in individual coun­
tries, its resolution is bound to have substantial consequences on the whole of the rest of 
their economies. And ... such changes could well have important implications for the 
sustainable pattern of real wages and exchange rates within the prospective euro-area.” 
Yet the structural reforms which he favors to reduce unemployment are more likely to 
strengthen than impair the competitive positions of the countries concerned, whereas the 
use of beggar-thy-neighbor devaluations to reduce unemployment will increase unem­
ployment in other EU countries, where unemployment rates are also high. No EU coun­
try can expect to export unemployment - directly or indirectly - because no other EU 
country can afford to import it.
9 This argument was invoked by McKinnon (1963) in his critique of Mundell’s analysis; a 
small country, he said, cannot exercise monetary autonomy in the exchange-rate sense, 





























































































In December 1995, at the Madrid Summit, it was decided that the monetary 
union will begin 1 January 1999, the final date given in the Maastricht Treaty. 
It was also decided that the question of eligibility will be resolved in the spring 
of 1998, as soon as 1987 data on inflation rates, interest rates, and fiscal out­
comes become available. The eligibility of each EU country will be decided by 
qualified majority voting at an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Minis­
ters attended by the heads of state or government. The Council will act “on the 
basis” of reports prepared by the European Commission and the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI) and after consultation with the European Parliament. 
The Council will assess a particular country “fulfils the necessary conditions 
for the adoption of a single currency”10. If a country is found to be eligible, it 
will enter the monetary union automatically, willing or not (but Denmark and 
the United Kingdom may choose to opt out).
The reports of the Commission and EMI will assess “progress made in the 
fulfilment by the Member States of their obligations regarding the achieve­
ment of economic and monetary union,” including the compatibility of each 
country’s legislation and central bank statute with the requirements of the 
treaty. The reports will also examine “the achievement of a high degree of 
sustainable convergence” by applying the so-called convergence criteria:
- the achievement of a high degree of price stability; this will be apparent 
from a rate of inflation which is close to that of, at most, the three best per­
forming Member States in terms of price stability;
- the sustainability of the government financial position; this will be appar­
ent from having achieved a government budgetary position without a deficit 
that is excessive as determined in accordance with Article 104c(6).
- the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the ex- 
change-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two 
years, without devaluing against the currency of any other Member State;





























































































- the durability of convergence achieved by the Member State and of its 
participation in the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary Sys­
tem being reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels.
The reports will also “take account of the development of the ecu, the re­
sults of the integration of markets, the situation and development of the bal­
ances of payments on current account and an examination of the development 
of unit labor costs and other price indices.”
A protocol to the Maastricht Treaty defines the convergence criteria more 
precisely. In the year preceding the assessment, a country’s inflation rate must 
not exceed by more than lb percentage points the inflation rate of the three 
best performing countries, and its long-term interest rate must not exceed by 
more than 200 basis points the interest rate of those same countries. But the 
protocol does not resolve an important ambiguity in the exchange-rate crite­
rion. When the treaty was drafted, the “normal” fluctuation margins of the 
EMS were 21/4 percent on each side of the central rate. The term “normal” 
was used to distinguish those margins from the 6 percent margins employed by 
new entrants to the exchange-rate mechanism. In August 1993, however, the 
margins were widened “temporarily” to 15 percent on each side of the central 
rate. Yet there has been no formal decision to treat those wide margins as the 
“normal” margins, though that is quite likely to happen.
Most of the EU countries are expected to satisfy the inflation-rate and inter­
est-rate criteria. Five countries do not now participate in the exchange-rate 
mechanism - Finland, Greece, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. But the 
Verona meeting of the Ecofin Council apparently agreed that those countries 
will be deemed to satisfy the two-year rule in the exchange-rate criterion if 
they begin to participate before the end of 19961 *.
The fiscal criterion represents a more difficult obstacle, because most of the 
EU countries are running large budget deficits. Furthermore, the procedures 
set out in the treaty pose several problems. Under Article 104c of the treaty, 
the Commission must assess adherence to fiscal discipline by applying two 
tests:
1  ̂ The Ecofin Council is the term used to identify meetings of the Council of Ministers at­
tended by Ministers of Finance or Economics. As the Verona meeting was “informal,” it 




























































































(a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross 
domestic product exceeds a reference value [3 percent], unless
- either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached 
a level that comes close to the reference value;
- or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only excep­
tional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value;
(b) whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds 
a reference value [60 percent], unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and 
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.
If the Commission finds that a country has an excessive deficit, using these 
tests, it must make a report to the Council of Ministers, which will then decide 
formally whether the country has an excessive deficit. Once a country is found 
to have an excessive deficit, the finding remains in force until the Council, 
acting on a recommendation by the Commission, abrogates the finding.
When this process was followed initially in 1993, the Commission submitted 
reports on 10 of the 12 EU countries, and the Council decided formally that 
those countries had excessive budget deficits. The Commission did not file a 
report on Luxembourg, which met both tests. It did not file a report on 
Ireland, although Ireland’s debt was much larger than 60 percent of GDP, be­
cause Ireland’s debt ratio had been falling for several years and its deficit was 
below 3 percent of GDP. Four observations are relevant here: 1
(1) There is an asymmetry lurking in Article 104c. As in the Irish case, the 
Commission can ‘shelter’ a country from an adverse finding by the Council 
merely by declining to file a report, but the Commission must make a positive 
recommendation before the Council can abrogate an adverse finding. Fur­
thermore, the Council does not have to accept the Commission’s recommenda­
tion. In June 1996, however, the Council abrogated its earlier decision on 
Denmark, for reasons like those given by the Commission in 1993, when it 
declined to file an adverse report on Ireland. Denmark’s budget deficit is be­
low 3 percent of GNP, and its debt ratio has been falling for the last few 
years. Hence, the Council may not take a tougher line than the Commission, 




























































































(2) When preparing their reports on eligibility, the Commission and EMI 
cannot really decide for themselves whether a country has an excessive deficit. 
They must ask whether the Council has decided that the country has an exces­
sive deficit and whether the decision remains in force. (Nevertheless, the EMI 
has already said that it will conduct its own assessment of compliance with all 
four convergence criterion. It is presumably determined to make sure that the 
criteria will be applied strictly, not bent by political considerations.)
(3) If the Council adheres strictly to the Maastricht Treaty, it must follow a 
two-step procedure in 1998. It must first decide whether to abrogate adverse 
findings already made under Article 104c. Until that has been done, the 
Commission and EMI cannot prepare their reports on eligibility and the 
Council cannot decide which countries meet the “necessary conditions for the 
adoption of a single currency.”
(4) When it ratified the Maastricht Treaty, the Bundestag declared that it 
would conduct its own assessment of eligibility, and it called on the German 
government to insist on a “strict” interpretation of the convergence criteria. 
Furthermore, the German government has recently proposed that countries 
joining the monetary union agree to a so-called stability pact, which would 
bind them to pursue even tighter fiscal policies than those required by the 
treaty. Hence, the Council of Ministers may be compelled to apply a strict in­
terpretation of the two tests defining an excessive deficit and to give little 
weight, if any, to the qualifying phrases in the treaty. To do otherwise would 
create an unacceptable precedent, even if, as now seems likely, there will be no 
formal stability pact.
The Commission’s fiscal forecasts, shown in Table 1, suggest that very few 
countries will pass the two fiscal tests if they are interpreted strictly - and the 
forecasts themselves may be optimistic. Seven countries are expected to have 
budget deficits no larger than 3 percent of GDP, but only two of them, France 
and Luxembourg, are expected to have debt ratios no larger than 60 percent of 
GDP. The rest of the low-deficit countries, however, are expected to have debt 
ratios below 80 percent of GDP, and it may be hard for the Council of Minis­
ters to treat them differently12. But two more countries, Austria and Sweden,
12 Two of them (Denmark and Ireland) are not now subject to an excessive-deficit finding 
under Article 104c. Finland and Germany are expected to have debt ratios very close to 
60 percent, although their ratios will have been rising. The Netherlands, usually seen as 





























































































are expected to have budget deficits very close to 3 percent of GDP, and their 
debt ratios are not projected to be much higher than that of the Netherlands.
There has been no shortage of proposals to ease or interpret the two fiscal 
tests in ways that would raise the number of eligible countries, but the figures 
in Table 1 warn us against using them, even if they were politically acceptable.
Not long ago, for example, 1 suggested that the Maastricht Treaty be 
amended so as to use the debt ratio as a criterion for applying the deficit test, 
not as a separate test. A country with a debt ratio no larger than 60 percent of 
GDP would be required to run a budget deficit no larger than 3 percent of 
GDP, but one with a higher debt ratio would be required to run a budget 
deficit no larger than 2 percent; see Kenen (1995a,b)l3. But the Commission’s 
forecasts show that none of the high-debt countries could come close to meet­
ing my test. More recently, Gros (1996) proposed that a country’s debt ratio 
be regarded as “approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace” if, over 
the three most recent years, the ratio has been declining continuously and the 
cumulative reduction has been no smaller than 15 percent of the difference 
between the initial debt ratio and the reference value. Of the 12 countries 
projected to have high debt ratios in 1997, however, only four (Belgium, 
Denmark, Ireland, and Italy) can be expected to show “continuous” reductions 
between 1994 and 1997, and only one of them (Ireland) can be expected to cut 
its debt ratio by as much as 15 percent of the initial gap.
It would still be possible, however, for the Commission and EMI to find 
that some countries which had excessive deficits in 1997 have come quite close 
to meeting the two fiscal tests and have met the other convergence criteria. It 
is worth noting, moreover, that the Maastricht Treaty does not require every 
EU country to meet all four criteria. In fact, the treaty does not even say that 
those four criteria are the ‘‘necessary conditions" which countries must fulfil 
in order to enter the monetary union. 13
13 But my proposal could also be used as a way to interpret Article 104c, not as an amend­
ment to it; a country having a budget deficit lower than 2 percent of GDP could be ex­
pected to experience a gradual reduction in its debt ratio. It has been widely noted that a 
country with a budget deficit no larger than 3 percent of GDP and a growth rate of nomi­
nal GDP no smaller than 5 percent per year will experience a gradual reduction in its debt 
ratio; in fact, the debt ratio will approach 60 percent asymptotically if the deficit is exactly 
3 percent and the growth rate is exactly 5 percent. (To achieve the latter, however, with­
out having an inflation rate higher than 3 percent, the country’s real GDP must grow by 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Locking the Participants’ Exchange Rates
No country seeking to satisfy the exchange-rate criterion may devalue its 
currency during the two years before the day in 1998 when the Council will 
choose the eligible countries. But no such constraint exists thereafter, from 
that day until 1 January 1999, when the participating countries will decide 
unanimously on the matrix of exchange rates at which they will enter the 
monetary union and the corresponding conversion rates between their curren­
cies and the euro - the currency of the monetary union. Hence, a country can 
devalue its currency to gain a competitive advantage or reduce the real value 
of its government debt14. This possibility has led to much concern about the 
risk of speculative attacks on the currencies of countries likely to undertake 
one last devaluation.
Several proposals have been made to deal with this risk, but some of them 
come into conflict with three other requirements: (1) The Maastricht Treaty 
says that the locking of exchange rates must not affect the external value of the 
ECU; i.e., there must be no ‘jump’ in the value of the ECU basket expressed in 
non-EU currencies. (2) The treaty also rules out any change in the currency 
weights that define the ECU basket. (3) The Madrid Summit decided that the 
euro and ECU must be exchangeable on a one-for-one basis at the start of the 
monetary union.
How do these provisions constrain the locking of exchange rates? Suppose 
that the countries chosen to enter the monetary union announced on 30 June 
1998 that one euro will equal one deutsche mark on 1 January 1999 and that 
the euro values of the other participants’ national currencies will equal the 
deutsche mark values of those currencies implied by the central rates obtaining 
on 30 June 1998. This would almost certainly cause a jump the value of the 
ECU on 1 January 1999, for three reasons: (a) the market values of the partic­
ipants’ currencies will not necessarily equal their central rates in terms of the 
deutsche mark on 1 January 1999; (b) the market values of the participants’ 
currencies multiplied by their fixed weights in the ECU basket are not likely
14 De Grauwe points out, however, that the need for unanimous agreement on the locking 
of exchange rates may effectively preclude unilateral exchange-rate changes in the period 
before the actual locking; a government that devalues its runs the risk that its partners will 
force it to rescind the devaluation before they will approve the locking of exchange rates; 
see De Grauwe’s contribution in Arrowsmith et al. (1996). For further discussion of the 
issues raised in this section, see Arrowsmith’s own contribution; also Arrowsmith 




























































































to equal one deutsche mark on 1 January 1999; and (c) the value of the ECU 
basket will depend in part on the values of the nonparticipants’ currencies, 
such as the pound, that are included in the ECU basket (and cannot be excluded 
because there can be no change in the composition of the basket).
Alternatively, the participants might announce that the value of the euro on 
1 January 1999 will equal the actual market value of the ECU on 30 June 1998 
and that the euro values of the participants’ currencies will equal their actual 
ECU values on that same date. This would reduce the likelihood of a large gap 
between the value of the euro and the value of the ECU on the eve of the 
actual locking of exchange rates; the value of the euro would not be fixed arbi­
trarily in terms of the deutsche mark. But it would not solve the other prob­
lems listed above; the market values of the participants’ currencies on 1 Jan­
uary 1999 will not necessarily equal their market values on 30 June 1998, and 
the value of the ECU will still be affected by the values of the nonparticipants’ 
currencies.
There is only one way to satisfy the requirements of the treaty and the 
Madrid decision, taken together. The locking of exchange rates on 1 January 
1999 must take place at the exchange rates actually prevailing just before the 
locking occurs. But this conclusion does not necessarily imply that govern­
ments must let market forces decide matters for them. They may not be able to 
choose in advance the conversion rates between their national currencies and 
the euro, but they may still be able to choose the exchange rates at which they 
will enter the monetary union - and those are more important for the countries 
themselves and for the behavior of the foreign-exchange market.
The risk of turmoil in the foreign-exchange market does not arise from the 
possibility of changes in the ECU or euro values of the participants’ currencies 
in the run-up to the locking of exchange rates. It arises from the possibility of 
changes in the matrix of exchange rates between those currencies. It should 
thus seem possible to minimize that risk by declaring in advance, as soon as the 
eligible countries are chosen, that the locking of exchange rates will occur at a 
matrix of rates defined by the then-current central rates (with or without a 
realignment to be announced on that same day). Alternatively, the declaration 
might say that the locking will occur at a matrix of rates defined by the aver­





























































































If deemed to be credible, such a declaration would cause market exchange 
rates to converge on the chosen rates - whether based on central rates or on 
average market rates - and would rule out a “jump” in the value of the ECU 
on 1 January 1999. The credibility of the declaration would, of course, be 
greatly enhanced if the participants’ central banks announced simultaneously 
that they would engage in unlimited intervention to keep exchange rates within 
their bands during the months between the declaration and the locking of ex­
change rates.
This strategy has one disadvantage. No one could know in advance the euro 
values of the participants’ currencies, because these would depend on the value 
of the ECU on 1 January 1999, and it would still depend in part on the values 
of the nonparticipants’ currencies. But that should not interfere seriously with 
preparations for the monetary union. Banks and others could revise their 
computer programs in advance but allow for last-minute insertion of the con­
version rates between the euro and the national currencies. It should be noted, 
moreover, that private institutions will not have to do business in euro on the 
first day of the monetary union15.
Concerns have been expressed about the possibility of speculative crises 
even after exchange rates have been locked (i.e., in the three years before the 
national currencies are replaced completely by the euro). This concern is 
based on a misunderstanding. The locked exchange rates will not be ‘defended’ 
by intervention on the foreign-exchange market. Article 52 of the Statute of 
the ECB requires the national central banks to buy and sell the participants’ 
currencies at their par values. In other words, there will be what I have called 
over-the-counter convertibility (Kenen, 1995a).
The implications can be described by asking what would happen if, in the 
United States, residents of the Third Federal Reserve District came to believe 
that the Philadelphia dollar might be devalued against the New York dollar. 
They would swap Philadelphia dollars for New York dollars; the Philadelphia 
dollars would find their way to the New York Federal Reserve Bank; and the 
Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank would then redeem them by transferring 
U.S. government securities to the New York Fed by way of an obscure insti­
tution known as the Interdistrict Settlement Fund.
15 Under the plan proposed by the EMI and endorsed by the Madrid Summit, the ECB and 
national central banks would adopt the euro immediately and use it in their money-market 
and foreign-exchange operations. Therefore, commercial banks would have to conduct 




























































































Returning to Europe, suppose that holders of French francs began to sell 
them for deutsche mark. The Bundesbank would ‘print’ the marks it needed to 
buy up the francs, and the Banque de France would buy back the francs by 
transferring franc-denominated assets to the Bundesbank via the ECB. The 
Bundesbank could not refuse to accept the franc-denominated assets if in­
structed to accept them by the ECB. In effect, the national central banks would 
be obliged to extend unlimited amounts of short-term credit to their partners 
and then to accept settlement in the assets ordinarily held by their partners. 
The Bundesbank would have no reason for concern about the money-supply 
effects of the switch from francs to marks, as it would not affect the money 
supply in the monetary union as a whole - and that would be the only relevant 
monetary aggregate16.
Linking the Insiders and Outsiders
When the Maastricht Treaty was drafted, little attention was paid to the 
possible need for an exchange-rate arrangement to link the currencies of the 
participants (insiders) and the nonparticipants (outsiders). In fact, the treaty 
contains only one explicit reference to the problem. Outsiders are instructed to 
treat their exchange-rate policies as a matter of concern to all EU countries 
and to “take account of the experience acquired in cooperation within the 
framework of the European Monetary System” (TEU, Article 109m). The is­
sue has come to the fore, however, for three reasons. First, there will be more 
outsiders than had been expected when the treaty was drafted. Second, late en­
trants to the monetary union will have to satisfy some sort of exchange-rate 
criterion, and doubts have been expressed about their ability to do that without 
help from the ECB in the framework of a formal exchange-rate arrange­
ment17. Third, the floating of the pound and lira in 1992 and their subsequent
16 These examples are drawn from Kenen (1995a) and De Grauwe’s contribution to Arrow- 
smith etal. (1996); see also Arrowsmith (1996).
17 In Kenen (1995a), I argued that a formal arrangement was not necessary for this pur­
pose, citing the case of Austria, which kept its currency tied tightly to the deutsche mark 
for many years without being a member of the EMS. But De Grauwe (1995) and others 
have argued persuasively that an outsider, having failed to qualify for the monetary 
union, could have trouble maintaining exchange-rate stability without help from a formal 
exchange-rate arrangement. Going further, De Grauwe and Gros (1996) both argue that 
an outsider must maintain exchange-rate stability to reduce its interest rates and thus re­
duce the cost of servicing its government’s debt; otherwise, it will have trouble meeting 




























































































depreciation, especially that of the lira, inspired charges of “exchange-rate 
dumping” and fears that the integrity of the single market could be jeopardized 
by large exchange-rate fluctuations.
Most economists, 1 said before, deny that a single market needs a single cur­
rency. And I agreed, although 1 said that the U.S. monetary union probably 
makes a significant contribution to the efficiency of the U.S. economy. Yet 
large exchange-rate fluctuations could still jeopardize the European single 
market by producing political tensions and pressures - especially pressures on 
national governments to subsidize or otherwise protect covertly the industries 
adversely affected by exchange-rate fluctuations. Eichengreen put the point 
neatly in his recent Graham Lecture at Princeton:
The corrosive effect of currency fluctuations was clearly evident in the 
wake of the 1992 depreciation of the lira. The lira’s decline caused a sharp de­
preciation of Italy’s real exchange rate and an appreciation of those of France 
and Germany. Given Europe’s increas-ingly integrated market, this boosted 
Italian exports, strengthened the current account, and helped to moderate the 
recession in Italy. But the repercussions abroad were strongly negative. The 
EU Commis-sioner for the Internal Market, Mario Monti, warned of 
“growing concern among industrialists that the lira’s devaluation in giving 
Italian companies an advantage over their European competitors ...” (Eichen­
green, 1996).
As a matter of fact, the French and German governments demanded that 
Brussels grant subsidies to the impacted industries.
There is now widespread support in Europe for a successor to the EMS, and 
the Ecofin Council endorsed the idea in principle at its Verona meeting. But 
the new arrangement, already known as EMS II, is apt to differ greatly from 
the EMS. Four sets of issues must be resolved.
combined with the need for outsiders to meet an exchange-rate criterion, implies that there 
must be a formal exchange-rate arrangement after the monetary union begins. But the 
need for an outsider to meet an exchange-rate criterion could be satisfied merely by re­
quiring that it maintain a stable exchange rate on its own; the criterion need not take the 
same form as the one in Article 109j, which refers explicitly to the EMS. The price-sta­
bility criterion, for example, will probably be recast after the monetary union begins; in­
stead of having an inflation rate that is not more than 1*4 percentage points above that of 
the three best-performing countries, a candidate for late entry to the union may be re­





























































































Governance. The Council of Ministers established the EMS, and its operat­
ing procedures were then defined by an agreement among the central banks, 
which also managed the short-term credit facilities of the EMS (a task that has 
been shifted to the EMI). Under the Maastricht Treaty, however, the Council 
of Ministers is not empowered to regulate relations between the euro and other 
EU currencies. Article 109 gives it certain powers in respect of relations 
between the euro and non-EU currencies but does not even mention other EU 
currencies.
An EMS II could be established by an agreement or set of agreements be­
tween the ECB and the outsiders’ central banks. But governments may not be 
willing to let central banks decide exchange-rate realignments on their own. 
And they may insist on a role for the Council of Ministers if, as seems likely, 
access to the credit facilities of an EMS II will depend on a country’s progress 
in meeting the various convergence criteria. Judgments on that score should 
presumably be made by the Council, not by the central banks.
Central Rates and Bands. Under the present EMS, a member’s obligations 
are defined by the grid of bilateral parities linking its currency to every other 
currency. The parities are obtained from each currency’s central rate in terms 
of the ECU, and they in turn define the band for each bilateral exchange rate. 
When any bilateral rate reaches the edge of its band, both countries involved 
must intervene to prevent the rate from moving further (and the strong-cur­
rency country is also required to lend its currency to the weak-currency 
country in order to finance intervention by the weak-currency country).
Under EMS II, the central rates and bands will probably be defined in terms 
of the euro, not a bilateral grid. But objections have been raised because this 
arrangement would allow large fluctuations in bilateral rates between out­
siders’ currencies. (With a 15 percent band on each side of a currency’s cen­
tral rate defined in terms of the euro, the exchange rate between two outsiders’ 
currencies could change by as much as 60 percent if one currency moved from 
the top to the bottom of its euro band and the other currency did the opposite.)
It would, of course, be possible for two outsiders to adopt a narrower band 
for their bilateral rate, but they might then be required to defend it on their 
own, without recourse to the credit facilities of EMS II. It would, in fact, be 
possible for each outsider to choose its own euro band with the ECB’s ap­
proval, and thus for two outsiders to choose euro bands that prevented wide 




























































































It has also been suggested that outsiders far from meeting the convergence 
criteria should be allowed or required to adopt wider-than-average euro bands 
to limit the need for the ECB to defend those currencies. The bands would 
then be narrowed as the countries came closer to meeting the convergence 
criteria18.
Intervention Obligations. Under the present EMS, central banks have open- 
ended intervention obligations. But those of the most important central bank 
were actually limited from the start. In 1979, the President of the Bundesbank, 
Otmar Emminger, wrote to the German Minister of Finance, drawing atten­
tion to the risk that mandatory intervention might undermine the Bundesbank’s 
monetary policy and proposing two remedies in case of a conflict between the 
Bundesbank’s obligations under the EMS and its obligation to maintain domes­
tic monetary stability. (1) The Bundesbank could ask the German government 
to seek an exchange-rate realignment. (2) If the government was unable to 
obtain a realignment, the Bundesbank would be relieved of its obligations un­
der the EMS and could cease to intervene. The Minister of Finance agreed to 
these terms by declaring in the Bundestag that the Bundesbank would intervene 
whenever intervention was appropriate19.
It was at first believed that the Bundesbank would successfully oppose any 
exchange-rate arrangement under which it would have to intervene in support 
of an outsider’s currency - and that was my own forecast (Kenen, 1995a). 
Shortly before the Verona meeting, however, a Franco-German meeting of 
finance ministers and central bank governors agreed that an EMS II would not
18 Carrying this theme further, Gros (1996) and Thygesen (1996) suggest that countries 
close to meeting the convergence criteria might elect to maintain the strictest type of ex­
change-rate stability by converting their central banks into currency boards. In effect, 
they would import the monetary policy of the ECB by fixing their euro exchange rates 
and defending those fixed rates by nonsterilized intervention. Gros goes on to suggest 
that such countries should be admitted to “associate status” in the monetary union. They 
would not merely import the ECB’s monetary policy but would also adopt all of its regu­
lations and participate in the payment system of the monetary union. But their central 
bank governors would not be allowed to vote in the Governing Council of the ECB. 
Gros believes that associate status would enhance the credibility of a country’s commit­
ment to a fixed exchange rate, allow it to enjoy lower interest rates, and thus help it to 
meet the fiscal convergence criterion. Such a country, however, could not expect to be 
included in the policy domain of the ECB and, unlike a full member of the monetary 
union, could not expect the ECB to buy domestic assets from its central bank in order to 
settle imbalances in the payment system. The costs of associate status might therefore ex­
ceed the benefits.





























































































be credible without some such commitment by the ECB, and two proposals 
have been discussed.
The first, already mentioned, would set up conditional line of credit for the 
outsiders’ central banks; they would be able to borrow euros from the ECB if 
their countries were making satisfactory progress in meeting agreed targets, to 
be defined in terms of the convergence criteria. The second, favored by the 
EMI, would incorporate the provisions of the so-called Emminger letter into 
the EMS II agreement. The ECB would be entitled to request an exchange-rate 
realignment (even, perhaps, the right to require one) if, in its view, it could 
not support an outsider’s currency without jeopardizing its commitment to 
price stability; see EMI (1996).
The Case o f the Unwilling Outsider. The British government has already 
said that it will not participate in an EMS II, and it is therefore adamantly op­
posed to any plan that would require all EU countries to join or would penal­
ize those that refused. It has suggested instead that the outsiders achieve 
exchange-rate stability by adopting inflation targets consistent with the target 
chosen by the ECB20. As a consequence, the Verona meeting agreed reluc­
tantly that membership in EMS II would be voluntary. Some governments, 
however, still want to find ways of achieving exchange-rate stability within the 
entire EU, by imposing a general commitment to exchange-rate stability on 
every EU country and, perhaps, imposing sanctions on a country that refuses 
to endorse that commitment.
EMU and the Outside World
Three questions are frequently raised about the effects of EMU on other 
countries and on the international monetary system:
• Will the fiscal consolidation required for EU countries to meet the con­
vergence criteria depress economic activity in Europe enough to reduce it in 
other countries or slow the growth of world trade?




























































































• How will the advent of the euro affect the role of the dollar as an interna­
tional currency?
• Will the EU be able and willing to participate effectively in the collabora­
tive work of the G-7 and other international bodies?
I will address each of them briefly.
Effects o f Fiscal Consolidation. With the exception of the United Kingdom, 
which is not expected to join the monetary union in 1999, every major EU 
country has undertaken reduce its budget deficit in an effort meet the fiscal 
tests set out in the Maastricht Treaty. This synchronized effort is worrisome. 
First, it is likely to reduce aggregate demand in the EU as a whole, adversely 
affecting output and employment and, in the process, making it harder for 
each country to reduce its own budget deficit. Second, it may adversely affect 
Europe’s trading partners, including countries in central and eastern Europe. 
Fiscal consolidation is, of course, necessary in most EU countries, even those 
that do not have big deficits or debts, to prepare for the large demographic 
changes they will face in the decades ahead. But the 1999 deadline has forced 
too many countries to move too fast.
The Commission (1996) remains optimistic about the near-term prospects 
for economic activity in Europe; it cites the recent appreciation of the dollar, 
an improvement in the profitability of investment, and easier monetary poli­
cies in Europe as reasons for believing that economic activity will rebound in 
the second half of 1996, and lower budget deficits will be helpful, not harm­
ful, because they will reduce long-term interest rates. And other institutions, 
including the EMI (1995b) have taken the same view. The EMI acknowledges, 
however, that this output-increasing effect will not materialize swiftly if an­
nouncements of fiscal-policy changes are not fully credible, and there are rea­
sons for doubt on that score. How many times have we been told that a pack­
age of policy changes will reduce a country’s budget deficit to 3 percent of 
GDP in 1997, only to be told a few months later that the next package will do 
the trick?
The problem cannot be solved by postponing the start of the monetary 
union for one or two years. A delay to buy additional time for fiscal consoli­
dation would surely reduce the credibility of subsequent fiscal-policy changes, 




























































































For the first time since the 1992 EMS crisis, many Europeans have be­
gun to believe that the monetary union will actually start in 1999, even if the 
EU will be forced to find ways around some of the obstacles in the treaty. 
Banks and other private institutions have begun to make the expensive invest­
ments required to shift to the euro soon after 1999. Expectations about future 
eligibility are being reflected in long-term interest rates. And the German 
recent elections have suggested that running against EMU may not be a 
promising political strategy, even in Germany. But the tide would turn quickly 
in the opposite direction at the first sign of a change in the schedule. There is,
I believe, only one way to minimize the down-side risks of fiscal consolidation 
- a further easing of German monetary policy to allow an easing of other 
countries’ policies.
Effects on the International Monetary System. Although the dollar is still 
the most important currency in the international monetary system, its relative 
importance has diminished gradually, and the advent of the euro will acceler­
ate that process. How and why?
Let me start with some things that will not happen. A few years ago, the 
Commission (1990) predicted that EU countries would have excess foreign- 
exchange reserves once the monetary union had begun, because they would no 
longer need reserves for EMS intervention. It said that they would want to run 
down their reserves. But currencies such as the deutsche mark will not ‘count’ 
as reserves for EU countries, as they will become euro-denominated domestic 
assets, and this transformation by itself will greatly reduce EU reserves21. 
Furthermore, the EU countries are not likely to injure themselves by selling 
surplus dollars and thus causing the dollar to depreciate against the euro. They 
will hold onto those, as as they have no attractive alternative. It has also been 
suggested that there will be a sharp shift into euros by European and other 
investors. That is not likely to happen, if only because the euro will not auto­
matically inherit the reputation of the deutsche mark. In fact, there could be a 
shift in the opposite direction.
In the longer run, however, euro-denominated assets will attract European 
and other investors, and the euro will probably be a strong currency, espe­
cially if the ECB attempts to establish its own credibility by adopting a fairly 
tight monetary policy. In addition, the substitution of the euro for the deutsche
21 The deutsche mark holdings of EU countries probably account for about 20 percent of 
EU foreign-exchange reserves and for about 25 percent of the currency reserves of EU 




























































































mark and other EU currencies will reduce the number of currencies traded on 
foreign-exchange markets, and the volume of trading in the euro will come 
quickly to exceed the combined volume of trading in its predecessors. One 
would therefore predict a reduction in transactions costs and, as a result, a 
change in the conduct of trading. Dealers will have less incentive to use the 
dollar as the vehicle currency when moving between two other currencies 
(i.e., to move from euros to pesos by selling euros for dollars and then selling 
dollars for pesos). A contraction in the vehicle role of the dollar could, in 
turn, reduce its use as an intervention currency and, therefore, its role as a 
reserve currency.
Effects on International Monetary Cooperation. Under Article 109 of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the ECB 
will all be involved in the making of EU exchange-rate policy vis-à-vis foreign 
currencies and in the making of other policies having particular relevance for 
EMU. Article 109 is meant to make sure that the EU “speaks with one voice” 
when addressing the rest of the world, but it suffers from a troublesome 
combination of negotiated ambiguity and bad drafting. It is incomplete and 
internally inconsistent. This is what it says:
1. By way of derogation from Article 228, the Council may, acting unani­
mously on a recommendation from the ECB or from the Commis-sion, and 
after consulting the ECB in an endeavour to reach a consensus consistent with 
the objective of price stability, after consulting the European Parliament, in 
accordance with the pro-cedure in paragraph 3 for determining the arrange­
ments, conclude formal agreements on an exchange-rate system for the ECU 
in rela-tion to non-Community currencies. The Council may, acting by a 
qualified majority on a recommendation from the ECB or from the Commis­
sion, and after consulting the ECB in an endeavour to reach a consensus con­
sisting with the objective of price stability, adopt, adjust or abandon the central 
rates of the ECU within the exchange-rate system. The President of the 
Council shall inform the European Parliament of the adoption, adjustment or 
abandon-ment of the ECU central rates.
2. In the absence of an exchange-rate system in relation to one or more non- 
Community currencies as referred to in paragraph 1, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority either on a recommenda-tion from the Commission and 
after consulting the ECB or on a recommendation from the ECB, may formu­




























































































cies. These general orientations shall be without prejudice to the primary ob­
jective of the ECB to maintain price stability.
3. By way of derogation from Article 228, where agreements con-cerning 
monetary or foreign-exchange regime matters need to be negotiated by the 
Community with one or more States or inter-national organizations, the 
Council, acting by a qualified major-ity or on a recommendation from the 
Commission and after consult-ing the ECB, shall decide the arrangements for 
the negotiation and for the conclusion of such agreements. These arrangements 
shall ensure that the Community expresses a single position. The Corn-mission 
shall be fully associated with the negotiations.
Agreements concluded in accordance with this paragraph shall be binding 
on the institutions of the Community, on the ECB and on Member States.
4. Subject to paragraph 1, the Council shall, on a proposal from the Com­
mission and after consulting the ECB, acting by a quali-fied majority decide 
on the position of the Community at inter-national level as regards issues of 
particular relevance to economic and monetary union and, acting unanimously, 
decide its representation in compliance with the allocation of powers laid down 
in Articles 103 and 105.
5. Without prejudice to Community competence and Community agree­
ments as regards economic and monetary union, Member States may negotiate 
in international bodies and conclude international agreements.
This article went through many drafts. Some governments sought to make 
sure that the Council could not force the ECB to intervene on foreign-ex­
change markets in a manner inconsistent with the pursuit of price stability. 
Other governments sought to make sure that national governments would re­
tain firm control over the EU’s exchange-rate policy. Even now, the wording 
is cumbersome, partly because we have no agreed language for describing the 
existing exchange-rate regime. The term “regime” does not even appear in 
Article IV of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 
which speaks of the “monetary system” and the exchange-rate “arrangements” 
of members (and then speaks of a “system of exchange arrangements”).
The meaning of paragraph 1 is fairly clearly. It defines the procedure that 
must be followed before the EU can agree to a binding agreement like that of 




























































































The second paragraph is clear on some points but not on others. The EU can­
not make informal agreements affecting the external value of the euro unless 
those agreements are fully compatible with price stability. But the text does 
not say who will judge that - or how.
The article as a whole, moreover, does not state clearly how the EU will 
participate in international discussions, such as those of the G-7 countries, 
about exchange-rate management, Paragraph 3, on negotiations about 
exchange-rate policy, cannot apply. First, it is cited in paragraph 1 but not in 
paragraph 2. Second, the final sentence of paragraph 3, on the binding nature 
of exchange-rate agreements, clashes with the careful language of paragraph 2, 
which speaks only of “general orientations” and can even be read to say that 
the ECB will decide for itself whether those “general orientations” are consis­
tent with the pursuit of price stability. We are thus left with paragraph 4, con­
cerning EU positions and representation on issues of “particular relevance” to 
EMU, but that paragraph says nothing whatsoever about exchange rates or the 
role of the Commission22.
Henning (1996) has urged the United States and other countries to ask how 
and when the EU governments will resolve the many questions raised by 
Article 109. Will there be rotating representation in international bodies such 
as the G-7 and G-10, as the Presidency of the Council passes semiannually 
from one EU country to another? What will happen when the Presidency is 
held by a government that is not a member of the G-7 or G-10? After France, 
Germany, and Italy have joined the monetary union, will they be represented 
separately when G-7 ministers or deputies discuss economic policies broadly 
and then represented collectively when the conversation turns to exchange-rate 
policy? But we are not likely to get answers soon - not before the 1998 deci­
sions on participation in the monetary union.
22 Curiously, the paragraph says that the matter of representation will be decided by una­
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